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Abstract 
 
Cyberattacks on industrial control systems 
(ICSs) can be especially damaging since they often 
target critical infrastructure.  Honeypots are 
valuable network-defense tools, but they are 
difficult to implement for ICSs because they must 
then simulate more than familiar protocols.  This 
research compared the performance of the Conpot 
and GridPot honeypot tools for simulating nodes 
on an electric grid for live (not recorded) traffic.  
We evaluated the success of their deceptions by 
observing their activity types and by scanning them.  
GridPot received a higher rate of traffic than 
Conpot, and many visitors to both were deceived as 
to whether they were dealing with a honeypot.  We 
also tested Shodan’s Honeyscore for finding 
honeypots, and found it was fooled by our 
honeypots as well as others when, like most users, 
it did not take site history into account.  This is good 
news for collecting useful attack intelligence with 
ICS honeypots. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Industrial control systems (ICSs) are important 
concerns for cybersecurity even though they are not 
attacked often, because an attack on critical 
infrastructure such as a power grid can have 
catastrophic effects on the operation of business 
and government [1].  ICSs are vulnerable due to 
their proprietary software and protocols, legacy 
devices, and outdated operating systems.  
Furthermore, they are difficult to update because 
many must provide continuous operation. 
Honeypots (decoy digital systems) are useful 
defensive tools to investigate cyberattack threats 
and other kinds of malicious activity.  It is useful to 
develop honeypots for ICSs to collect intelligence 
on their kinds of attacks.  However, creating an 
effective honeypot for ICSs is more difficult than 
for most network nodes because they must simulate 
a wide variety of real-time industrial processes 
using proprietary protocols as well as standard 
protocols like TCP/IP.  If ICS honeypots are not 
simulated accurately, attackers may realize they are 
being deceived and go away, failing to provide 
useful intelligence. 
We installed two open-source industrial-
control-system honeypots, Conpot [2] and GridPot 
[3], and studied the live traffic to them to evaluate 
their effectiveness.  GridPot is a modified Conpot 
designed to simulate different electric-grid models.  
Conpot is simpler and served as a control 
experiment to see if GridPot was a significant 
advance.  While they have been assessed 
separately, no previous experiments have 
compared their performance in the same 
environment.  We also checked whether a 
commonly used network scanning tool could 
identify these and similar honeypots. 
2. Background  
2.1. Electric grids 
 
Our experiments focused on ICSs simulating 
electrical grids.  An electric grid (or bulk electric 
power system) includes generation, transmission, 
distribution, and end use [4].  The generation of 
electricity occurs in many ways including coal-
fired plants, natural-gas plants, solar farms, wind 
turbines, and hydroelectric plants.  Generated 
electricity is passed through transformers to step up 
voltage to a very high level where it is then 
transferred to transmission lines.  Transmission 
lines deliver electricity to substations.  Substations 
use a transformer to step down the voltage from 
high to low voltage before it is distributed to end 
users.  A switch is a device used to direct the flow 
of current by opening and closing a circuit.  A 
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 substation employs each of these devices to safely 
control the transfer of current from transmission to 
distribution.  Regulators ensure a constant and safe 
voltage level is maintained throughout the bulk 
power system. 
Software now allows operators to monitor and 
control portions of an electric grid without being at 
each physical location.  SCADA (Supervisory 
Control and Acquisition) devices, a subset of ICSs, 
in particular allow operators to monitor many 
devices over a wide area.  An IED (Intelligent 
Electronic Device) like a controller or a digital 
relay can send or receive data or control to or from 
an external source.  ICSs are a subtype of cyber-
physical systems, which integrate physics and logic 
to allow interaction between digital, analog, 
physical, and human components.   
Electrical grids and related infrastructure have 
been targeted by a number of types of malware [5].  
Well-reported cases involved CRASHOVERRIDE 
or Industroyer, STUXNET, BLACKENERGY 2, 
and HAVEX. In December 2016, a transmission-
level substation was attacked in the Ukraine using 
CRASHOVERRIDE [6].  Proof that grid 
operations can be severely affected by a 
cyberattack was demonstrated in a U.S.  
Department of Energy test which caused the self-
destruction of a replica power plant generator by 
means of a cyberattack [7]. 
Cyber threats that target the distribution 
portion of the bulk power system are load shedding, 
advanced metering infrastructures, and demand-
side management [8].  The U.S. has seen load-
shedding incidents in recent years that have caused 
cascading power outages.  In 2007, Tempe, Arizona 
experienced large-scale load shedding which 
affected 98,700 customers for almost an hour. 
2.2. Honeypots for ICSs 
Our research explored the use of honeypots to 
collect data of cyberattacks on electric utilities.  
Honeypots can be most useful for gathering 
information about attacks when they entice 
attackers into revealing a rich set of information 
about their attacks [9].  Honeypots that conceal 
their purpose through deception are more 
productive because attackers do not want to interact 
with honeypots [10].  High-interaction honeypots 
can confuse attackers through program-based or 
scripted interaction designed to encourage further 
exploration.  However, some botnets have evolved 
to become aware of honeypots [11] by detecting 
firewalls and filters on outbound traffic.  Honeypots 
desire to limit their liability in case they are used to 
launch an attack on a third party.  This could be 
done with an intrusion-detection system that filters 
for outbound activity.  A bot that is prevented from 
spreading malicious data from a honeypot would 
detect that and recognize it is on a honeypot. 
Several projects have used honeypots to 
monitor attacks on ICSs.  One project deployed a 
large-scale cloud-based low-interaction honeypot 
system for 28 days using Amazon’s EC2 cloud 
environment [12].  This experiment monitored the 
protocols DNP3, ICCP, IEC-104, Modbus, SNMP, 
TFTP, and XMPP.  The researchers concluded that 
reconnaissance occurred more often than actual 
attacks and it targeted single protocols rather than 
combinations of protocols.  They also identified a 
positive correlation between Modbus 
reconnaissance and discovery by the Shodan 
network-scanning tool of Modbus-enabled devices. 
HoneyPhy [13] addressed the problem that ICS 
honeypots could be unrealistic in modeling device 
physics and device-actuation times and therefore 
could be identifiable.  One honeypot they designed 
provided general structure-modeling processes and 
devices implementing a simple heating-ventilation 
system.  Another modeled a simplified water-
treatment system. 
The GasPot honeypot simulated the Veeder-
Root Guardian aboveground storage- tank 
monitoring system [14].  Logs revealed 
unauthorized reads and writes, defacement, and 
denial of service attacks . GasPot was subsequently 
integrated into Conpot as the guardian_ast 
template.   Similarly, the kamstrup_382 template 
provided by Conpot mimics a Kamstrup model 
382 smart electrical meter, providing an electrical 
power metering service on port 1025 and a 
management service on port 50100.  The hardware 
on which this is based provides measurement of 
electrical circuits up to three-phase ones, allows 
remote access by way of optional modules for 
TCP/IP networking over Wi-Fi, GSM, and GPRS 
connectivity, and enables local interaction via 
optional serial and infrared interfaces. 
Another honeypot architecture used 
geographically dispersed nodes hosted on Amazon 
Elastic Cloud Compute with emulation support for 
the protocols DNP3, ICCP, IEC 104, Modbus, SNMP, 
TFTP, and XMPP  [15].  In experiments, the Shodan 
network scanner provided the first unsolicited 
interaction with five of the six honeypots, and 
attacks began only after each honeypot was listed 
on Shodan.  This suggests that attackers are 
exploiting network-scanning databases.   
Other similar honeypot projects were CryPLH 
[16] and the Digital Bond SCADA Honeynet [17].  
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 2.3. Network scanning 
Honeypots may be detectable by distinctive 
clues they provide to network protocols.  Network 
scanning can look for these.  Transport- layer 
scanners send some combination of TCP, UDP, 
and ICMP packets to a remote host, waiting an 
assigned time for responses.  Nmap (nmap.org) is 
popular tool for transport-layer scanning.  
Protocol scanners interact with specific application-
level protocols and require expertise with 
proprietary communications protocols.  For 
instance, Digital Bond’s Redpoint uses Nmap’s 
NSE tool to use ICS protocols [18]. Within 
Redpoint the s7-info.nse script can do simple 
interactions with Siemens PLC devices with port 
102 and S7Comm. 
Some scanners focus on specific protocols like 
zmap (zmap.io), and others scan more broadly such 
as ZoomEye (www.zoomeye.org).  The Shodan 
scanner (www.shodan.io) scans Internet-connected 
hosts continuously. I t  a p p e a r s  to pick IP 
addresses randomly and is more successful in the 
IPv4 address space [19]. The Shodan website 
provides a service called Honeyscore which uses 
a proprietary algorithm to i d e n t i f y  honeypots. 
Project SHINE f o r  t w o  y e a r s  queried 
Shodan for selected search terms, starting with 
manufacturer names from trade magazines and 
blogs, and continuing by query terms derived from 
the results of searches on manufacturer names [20].  
Eventually they sampled 2,186,971 devices from 
which they derived 578 unique search terms for 
traditional industrial-control system devices and 
349 search terms for “non-traditional” devices but 
having physical controls of some kind.  The 
protocols studied were S7Comm, Modbus, DNP3, 
EtherNet/IP, and BACNet.  Scanning did include 
the possibility of duplicate devices and NAT 
connections. 
In another experiment, a Siemens RuggedCom 
RS910 was configured to respond as a water pump 
[21].  This RUGGEDTRAX honeypot was 
configured to run SSH, HTTP, HTTPS, and DNP3 
services. The device firmware name and version 
were displayed on its HTTPS web page, alongside a 
fictitious System Name indicating a water well in a  
s p e c i f i c  l o c a t i o n .  The firmware sent a 
variant of the “goahead” embedded web server 
banner.  The honeypot was indexed by Shodan two 
days after being connected to Internet. 
An experiment with the Bodenheim tool [19] 
observed the success of Shodan in  identifying 
Internet-connected industrial-control system 
devices.  For 55 days Bodenheim connected a set 
of four Allen-Bradley ControlLogix 1756-L61 
controllers to the Internet as honeypot.  Two 
controllers connected with an unmodified 
“Standard” HTTP banner, one with an “Obfuscated” 
banner, and one with an “Advertised”  HTTP banner.  
All four were probed within four days of 
deployment, and t wo  wi t h i n  a  d a y ;  data from 
all four was visible on the Shodan website within 
19 days of deployment, despite never having 
provided their addresses to Shodan.  This could 
reflect historical data about the addresses.  
3. Experiments with Conpot  
 
We first tested a low-interaction ICS honeypot, 
Conpot from conpot.org [2].  It simulates an ICS 
such as a power plant and collects information of 
cyberattacks.  It acts as a master server for 
commonly used ICS network protocols and 
provides multiple templates that simulate simple 
forms of them.  Conpot served as our control 
experiment for the subsequent experiments with 
GridPot.  More details are in [22]. 
3.1. Methodology 
Our experiments used a laptop computer with 
a Linux Ubuntu 16.04.3 LTS operating system.  A 
Linux virtual machine was installed using Oracle 
VM Virtualbox 5.1.20, and Conpot 0.5.1 was 
installed in it.  A local network was set up outside 
of our school’s firewall to make it easier for live 
attackers to discover the honeypot without 
advertising it.  Both the host and virtual machines 
used statically assigned IPv4 addresses and 
communicated with internal bridged networking.  
While our local network could not be mistaken for 
a major ICS installation, it could simulate a small 
node on an electrical grid.   
Conpot offers four different templates.  In our 
first experiments we used the “default template” 
which simulates an electric-power plant using 
Siemens SIMATIC S7-200 Programmable Logic 
Controllers that communicate with at least two 
slaves.  Conpot simulates the initial interactions 
with the protocols HTTP, Modbus over TCP/IP, 
S7Comm, SNMP, BACnet, IPMI, EtherNet/IP, and 
CIP.  We created parsers to extract clues from log 
data for each protocol such as IP addresses, ports, 
and basic protocol-specific data.  The IPMI 
emulator was special in that it mimics a baseboard 
management controller supporting functions such 
as “chassis status” and “user list”, and permits 
manipulation of system power [23]. 
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 3.2. Conpot results 
Our honeypot collected live traffic over four 
months from October 2017 to February 2018 
except when the main log was backed up.  The 
network protocol analyzer Wireshark 
(www.wireshark.org) monitored and captured 
network traffic.  Table 1 summarizes the traffic 
counts by protocol seen by Conpot and in the 
subsequent experiments with GridPot.
Table 1: Traffic percentages by protocol in live-traffic testing of the two honeypots. 
Protocol Conpot 
count 
Conpot 
percentage 
GridPot 
count 
GridPot 
percentage 
HTTP 7,366 66.7% 9,641 93.0% 
Modbus 2,316 21.0% 621 6.0% 
S7Comm 645 5.8% 102 1.0% 
BACnet 311 2.8% 0 0.0% 
IPMI 262 2.4% 0 0.0% 
EtherNet/IP 154 1.4% 0 0.0% 
Total 11,054 100% 10,364 100% 
 
 
Only 59 of the 2,316 Modbus activities had a 
valid Modbus function code of the 19 possible: 
0x03 (Read Holding Register), 0x2b (Read Device 
Identification), and 0x11 (Report Server ID).    
These suggest reconnaissance only.  Spikes of 
activity occurred on November 13, November 23, 
December 8, and January 10.  On November 16, 
ICS-CERT released a security advisory about 
Siemens SICAM equipment; Modbus is supported 
by this product, and the equipment emulated by 
Conpot is also a Siemens product, so that probably 
explains two of the activity spikes.  
With EtherNet/IP activities, only NOP, 
RegisterSession, and ListIdentity commands were 
used.  Invalid commands or null commands were 
also observed; these suggest probing attempts.  For 
S7Comm, all packets had a data length of 0 or 8 and 
a request ID of 0.  For BACnet, some data 
apparently was sent for all 78 established 
connections using an invalid type, resulting in 78 
decoding errors, but we could not identify where it 
came from.  For IPMI activities, 129 had new 
traffic, 30 were returning traffic, and only 2 
sessions were properly closed.   
More overall activity occurred in October and 
November, and then it gradually declined (Figure 
1), as is typical of new honeypots.  The decline was 
predominantly due to HTTP and the spikes were 
predominantly due to Modbus activities.  Claimed 
nationalities of the attacks were all over the world, 
suggesting diverse international reconnaissance 
(Table 2).   
Table 2: Country claimed by Conpot 
attack traffic observed. 
Country Percent Country Percent 
U.S. 27% Netherlands 5% 
China 22% Hong Kong 4% 
Brazil 8% France 4% 
Russia 8% Indonesia 3% 
Egypt 6% Indonesia 3% 
India 6% Japan 3% 
 
As could be expected with a low-interaction 
honeypot, overall traffic was mostly 
reconnaissance.  Conpot traffic concentrated on the 
most familiar protocol, HTTP, despite its limited 
capability on this honeypot.  Modbus traffic 
appeared to be testing access permutations using 
many malformed packets.  EtherNet/IP and 
Modbus activities showed that Conpot had 
difficulty distinguishing between real protocol 
activities and embedded protocol requests sent to 
the ports on which Conpot listened.  Since Conpot 
only logs basic flow data, embedded payloads to 
unnoticed. 
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Figure 1: Conpot activity count of all protocols over time.
4. Experiments with GridPot 
We also tested the GridPot open-source high-
interaction ICS honeypot framework 
(github.com/sk4ld/gridpot).  It uses GridLAB-D, a 
simulation and analysis tool for power-distribution 
systems (gridlab.org), developed by the U.S. 
Department of Energy and Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory to enable modeling and testing 
of power distribution systems at low cost [24].  It 
was run on the same local network as our Conpot 
experiments to enable a fair comparison.  More 
details are in [25]. 
4.1. Setup 
GridLAB-D Model objects used in our 
honeypot were the node, link, switch, transformer, 
and regulator.  Object node properties include 
phases, object connections, open status, power 
flow, temperature, tap position, and configuration.  
Objects can include schedules of parameter values 
over time.  Network protocols we supported with 
GridPot were HTTP, Modbus, S7Comm, SNMP, 
and IEC 61850. 
GridPot uses a honeypot layer and a modeling 
layer to add electrical components and integration 
between GridLAB-D and Conpot, including IEC 
61850 communication.  GridPot’s honeypot layer 
is derived from Conpot, adding an XML-formatted 
GridPot template that specifies to which GridLAB- 
D model to link.  Additional Python-coded GridPot 
files are included in the honeypot layer to retrieve 
parameter values from the running model in real 
time using port 6267.   
GridPot’s primary modeling layer uses 
GridLAB-D’s Powerflow module, adding GridPot 
model (GPM) configuration files.  Powerflow 
simulates voltage and current values across an 
IEEE 13 node grid model with 15 houses.  GridPot 
source code includes additional modeling features 
for “intelligent electronic devices” under an electric 
components subdirectory.  This contains code to 
simulate a GE Brick Merging Unit and a generic 
input/output switch control device.   
Our experiments used both a test environment 
and a live environment.  The test environment 
altered the Conpot code to use its localhost IP 
address instead of the host environment’s external 
IP address, which kept traffic internal to our 
machine for testing.  The live environment enabled 
external user access and threat data collection from 
outside the school firewall.  We used network-
address-translation, host-only-adapter, and 
bridged-adapter network settings in both 
environments.   
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 We used Oracle VM Virtualbox 5.2.22 to 
install a virtual machine in which to place GridPot.  
It ran the same operating system as the host.  The 
honeypot layer initialized Conpot using the GridPot 
template and the modeling layer initialized the 
GridLAB-D model IEEE_13_Node_With_Houses.  
We updated the “gridpotmodel_file” field value to 
link with our custom GPM file for the latter.  Four 
protocol servers were started upon launch as 
written in the original source code.  Modbus is used 
on TCP/IP port 502 connecting to one client and 
two servers. 
The IEEE_13_Node_With_Houses model 
contained switch, transformer, and regulator 
objects used for the Conpot integration and 
required minimal code modifications.  A schedule 
based on local time was used to alter power flow 
readings across the switch.  Real-time power-in and 
power-out simulated switch parameter values 
which were displayed on our web-based interface.  
We created a GPM file to link with the switch, 
transformer, and regulator objects specified in the 
IEEE_13_Node_With_Houses GLM file by 
modifying an existing GPM file. 
4.2. Testing 
We used the Wireshark network-protocol 
analyzer (www.wireshark.org) to confirm that 
Conpot and Gridpot logs were complete; the Nmap 
(nmap.org) and Linux Netstat built-in network 
scanners to check which ports were open; the 
Nessus vulnerability-assessment tool 
(www.tenable.com) to check for obvious 
vulnerabilities; and the Metasploit penetration 
tester (www.metasploit.com) to test logging of 
attacks.  Nessus and Metasploit were used with 
SCADA plugins.  
First we tested if our web-based interface 
display was accurate to the running model by 
pointing a web-browser to GridPot’s HTTP server 
using localhost IP address and TCP port 80, and 
comparing the results to the GridLAB-D model 
instance that listened on port 6267.  We then used 
the Netstat tool to determine which ports were 
opened by GridPot.  We then ran scans using 
Nmap, Nessus, and Metasploit against our 
honeypot.  We focused these scans on open ports 
and probed for operational-technology devices 
using the Modbus protocol by running detection, 
discovery, and interaction scans.  We focused on 
Modbus since it is the most common ICS protocol. 
Host-to-virtual-machine baseline testing first 
required altering our network connectivity from 
disabled-network status to host-only status.  We 
tested the host-only network status using “ping” 
commands between our host and virtual machine 
and confirmed receipt of a “network is 
unreachable” error when trying to ping an arbitrary 
IP address.  The same scans using Nmap, Nessus, 
and Metasploit were then performed, changing the 
IP address to our GridPot virtual machine instead 
of the localhost address.  To generate useful log 
data for comparison against live denial-of-service 
attacks, we conducted a scan using an auxiliary 
Metasploit module. 
We modified portions of the default Conpot 
configuration in the template to eliminate well-
known clues to Conpot and fool more attackers.   
Testing confirmed our web-based interface 
accurately displayed values of the running 
GridLAB-D model.  Netstat results confirmed that 
our four protocol ports (HTTP, Modbus, S7Comm, 
and SNMP) were open.  Results of the Nmap, 
Nessus, and Metasploit scans also saw these ports 
as open and that Modbus-enabled devices were 
running on our honeypot. 
Our live honeypot collected data over 19 days 
from April 11-30, 2019.  GridPot ran continuously 
except when we fixed a broken link.  Conpot 
stopped logging twice, which could have been due 
either to bugs or malicious activity that we could 
not distinguish. 
4.3. GridPot results 
Live GridPot traffic data collected by 
Wireshark totaled 1,525,059 packets and 165 MBs.  
This was a higher traffic rate of 545 interactions per 
day versus 92 with Conpot. The GridPot protocol 
distribution differed from that of Conpot (Table 1).  
BACnet, IPMI, and EtherNet/IP were not included 
in the GridPot template we used and so were not 
logged, though there was likely a small amount of 
their traffic judging by the Conpot results.  HTTP 
traffic was a larger percentage of traffic with 
GridPot.  This is likely due to the additional 
deceptions beyond Conpot provided by GridPot 
that were accessible by HTTP, though a 
contributing factor could be the increasing numbers 
over a year of real electric grids that use HTTP [1].  
It thus appears that GridPot’s additional deceptions 
are justified and effective. 
Heavy scanning with Modbus was seen twice.  
39 unique source addresses sent packets to our 
honeypot multiple times, some of which 
demonstrated information had been learned from 
the first interaction. 
The greatest number of packets (1,013,726) 
came from a California-based cloud-hosting 
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 corporation.  It came from an address registered to 
Fastly, a content delivery network provider.  
GridPot exchanged 84,588 packets with just one 
Fastly address using MaxMind.  Traffic from this 
address occurred throughout our collection, and 
contained over 26,000 retransmissions of nearly 
identical ACK messages, so this campaign was not 
intelligent. 
The second-highest source of packets was an 
IP address registered to an LLC in St.  Petersburg, 
Russia, which was responsible for 56,280 packets 
of 3,221KB.  Censys.io traced this address to a 
Debian-based SSH server in Amsterdam.  38,754 
were SYN packets sent to GridPot, and there were 
also RST packets. 
Seven different HTTP methods were seen in 
the HTTP requests, including 79 “None” and 78 
“Bad”.  Significant spikes in the number of HTTP 
requests occurred almost daily (Figure 2). Each 
peak contained roughly the same number of GET 
and POST request methods in the same order with 
varying speeds.  This suggests these attackers used 
a single HTTP scanning tool to conduct the attacks, 
and were not inspecting their results carefully.  We 
compared this apparent scanning to our host-to-
virtual-machine logs and concluded that steps of 
the real scans did not match any of our test scans 
because of the quite different distributions in the 
times of HTTP commands for these attacks.   
Most Modbus traffic used the “none” function 
code, and the remainder split between function 
codes 17 and 43, totaling 597, 5, and 2, 
respectively.   Protocol scanning using Modbus was 
visible in the form of incrementing slave ID 
numbers with each new request seen.  By 
comparing to our host-to-virtual-machine logs, we 
inferred that Nmap and the “modbus-discover.nse” 
script were used in both cases by the similarity in 
the sequencing of function code, the slave ID, the 
request values, and the response values. 
We observed 20 new S7Comm sessions, 102 
S7Comm connections, 13 COTP connection 
requests, and 19 S7 packets.  S7Comm messages 
were only of types 1 and 7, with counts 6 and 13 
respectively. 
Configuring GridPot was difficult due its lack 
of updating. But once configured, it proved 
successful at collecting intelligence for threat 
analysis.  It is apparent that attackers thoroughly 
explore Web-based vulnerabilities in ICS 
interfaces, as seen in the large amount of HTTP 
traffic captured.  The Modbus scanning indicated 
that our simulated grid was realistic enough to 
encourage specialized-protocol reconnaissance. 
 
 
Figure 2: GridPot HTTP requests during live testing. 
5. Testing scanning for honeypots 
We also conducted tests using network scanning 
tools to try to detect honeypots [26].  Most of 
experiments used Shodan’s Honeyscore, which rates a 
site from 0.0 (not a honeypot) to 1.0 (definitely a 
honeypot).  The Honeyscore tool was sure that our 
final GridPot implementation was a honeypot when its 
history was taken into account, but was sure it was not 
a honeypot without the history.  This is likely because 
we have reused the IP addresses often for other 
honeypot projects [27, 28], so Shodan’s automated 
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 scanning has found them many times, but the 
customization of the configuration of our GridPot 
implementation appeared to be a sufficient disguise of 
the honeypot without knowing the history.  In fact, the 
disguise of our GridPot implementation may have 
been better than that of previous honeypots on the site 
because its traffic was significantly higher than the 
others, so not many visitors were inspecting the 
scanning history. 
To further explore these issues, we examined the 
records of 122,668 Internet sites in Shodan’s database 
collected between April 22, 2016 and April 20, 2017 
that had records for one of eight ports known to be 
specifically related to ICSs according to the Digital 
Bond ICS Enumeration plugin: Modbus, S7Comm, 
BACnet, CODESYS, Niagara Fox, OMRONFINS, 
ProconOS, and Ethernet/IP.  For 114 of these, no 
Honeyscore was reported for reasons unexplained.  Of 
the remainder, 1063 sites had a Honeyscore of 0.5 or 
larger for a rate of 0.87%.  Shodan does not publish 
their criteria for Honeyscore, apparently to discourage 
honeypot developers from engineering easy 
countermeasures.  However, some clues are obvious, 
so as a simple test, we explored three heuristics: 
• H1: A device which services the S7Comm 
protocol on tcp/102 and returns the terms 
“Technodrome”, “Mouser”, or “88111222” is a 
honeypot.  These strings occur in the PLC Name, 
Plant ID, and Serial number fields in Conpot 
default implementations.  These are implausible 
as values in a production S7Comm service. 
• H2: A device providing the same ICS services 
as Conpot’s default template, plus or minus one 
service, is a honeypot.  Those services are HTTP 
(port 80), S7Comm (102), SNMP (161), Modbus 
(502), IPMI (623), and BACnet udp (47808).  It is 
unusual to see these services together otherwise. 
• H3: A device providing industrial-control 
services from a public cloud location is running a 
honeypot.  Cloud locations came from hosts 
identified as matching H1 in the Shodan data,  
names with the keywords “cloud” or “hosting”, and 
names listed in a “Most Reliable Hosting 
Company Sites” page at Netcraft.com.   
None of these rules applied to our GridPot site: 
• H1 does not apply because we changed default 
strings in our implementation.  However, when 
we ran Conpot a year previously, it had the 
default strings [22]. 
• H2 does not apply because using Nmap against 
our GridPot honeypot, we found open ports 80, 
102, 502, 6267, 8834, and 11211, so a scanner 
could match only 3 of the 6 target ports with 3 
extra ports. 
• H3 does not apply because our site did not offer 
any of those clues to directory services.  It was 
listed by our Internet Service Provider (AT&T) as 
being associated with our school, but that is not 
one of the clues. 
To test the heuristics, we supplemented the 1063 
high-Honeyscore sites with all sites matching either 
H1, H2, or H3 in the Shodan database, to get a test set 
of 8127 sites.  We manually inspected other scanning 
data to estimate that 748 of these were honeypots 
(9.2%).  This inspection used DNS node data, IP 
geolocations, and “whois” service data whenever there 
was a strong disagreement between Honeyscore and 
our heuristics.  For some hosts we transmitted active 
probes using the Nmap OS detection method and 
observed the response.  Among the sites found from 
manual inspection were 550 Conpot clones identified 
by duplicated ICS serial numbers, duplicated SSH 
fingerprints on controllers, and in one case, an FTP 
honeypot on the same site. 
Overall counts on the test set are shown in Table 
3.  We assumed a Honeyscore ≥ 0.5 as “ground truth” 
of a honeypot, and ignored the missing Honeyscore 
values.  Then in the sample of 8127, H1 had a 
precision of 1.00, recall of 0.20, and an F-score of 
0.33; H2 had a precision of 0.28, recall of 0.92, and an 
F-score of 0.43; H3 had a precision of 0.03, recall of 
0.14, and an F-score of 0.14.  So H2  was the best and 
H3 was the worst. Note there is a tradeoff between 
precision and recall which will need to be best set 
based on information-security priorities. 
As for identifying honeypots using Honeyscore 
alone, the precision for Honeyscore ≥ 0.5 was 
748/1063 = 0.703.  The recall was difficult to estimate, 
but it must be close to 1.0 because for H1 we found 7 
sites with lower Honeyscores that we confirmed were 
honeypots; for H2 we found only 1 of 108 lower 
Honeyscores were honeypots; and for H3 we found no 
honeypots in a sample of 100 with lower Honeyscores.  
Thus the F-score is close to 0.70.  Thus our heuristics 
can model some but not all of Honeyscore 
functionality. 
Thus we conclude that Shodan can be fooled by 
an ICS honeypot with a few simple modifications to 
the default configuration that we can find by testing 
heuristics, provided Shodan is not examining site 
history.  But on the other side of the coin, these results 
suggest that probes and attacks that do use history 
should be easy to fool with “fake honeypots” [29], 
real ICSs that have artifacts, services, and history of 
honeypots; Shodan’s outdated information will “scare  
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 Table 3: Results of testing a sample of 
122,068 sites in Shodan's database for 
honeypot clues. 
H1 H2 H3 Honeyscore ≥ 
0.5? 
Count 
Y Y Y Y 81 
Y Y N Y 16 
Y N Y Y 3 
Y N  N Y 41 
N Y Y Y 25 
N Y N Y 566 
N N Y Y 234 
N N N Y 97 
Y Y Y N 1 
Y Y N N 2 
Y N Y N 0 
Y N N N 2 
N Y Y N 1 
N Y N N 1762 
N N Y N 4175 
N N N N 115548 
N Y N missing 2 
N N Y missing 3 
N N N missing 109 
 
 
away” attacks and help protect these sites.  Then if 
attackers try to counter this by ignoring the historical 
data and just testing the current properties of the site 
with heuristics like H1, H2, and H3, some small 
modifications to the site like those of our GridPot 
implementation will cause a Shodan-like system to 
conclude a real honeypot is not a honeypot.  The nice 
thing about this strategy is that the sort of attackers 
for which this will work best are the more 
sophisticated and intelligent attackers who gather 
thorough intelligence before focused attacks, so these 
sites can provide some sorely needed defensive 
techniques for attackers to which we are especially 
vulnerable. 
6. Conclusions 
Due to their real-time requirements and 
proprietary protocols, ICSs are more difficult to 
simulate with honeypots than other kinds of network 
nodes.  The two ICS-honeypot frameworks we tested, 
Conpot and GridPot, did seem to be effective, 
however; we saw more traffic to them, and more 
varied traffic, than to our previous secure-shell and 
Web honeypots despite the rarity of ICS sites on the 
Internet.  GridPot was definitely more successful at 
deception than Conpot because it generated a higher 
rate of traffic, mostly HTTP. Deception was effective 
for both honeypots because most traffic either did not 
recognize features of a honeypot or did not care.  For 
the minority of attackers who either inspect sites or 
use scanning tools against them, our sites were 
probably easy to recognize as honeypots since they 
were not on a specialized subnetwork.  However, this 
means that a different kind of deception, “fake 
honeypots” that are real ICSs with honeypot artifacts 
like default Conpot configuration names, could 
encourage these attackers to leave. 
Future work will explore this as well as adding 
more simulated devices and services to ICS 
honeypots to keep attackers interested longer.  Future 
work will also involve industry collaborators.  Our 
data is available for other researchers to use under 
restrictions. 
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